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 Burak Bilgehan Ozpek
 Turkey's presidential and parliamentary election processes in 2007 caused a
 debate over the nature of the country's Europeanization - its gradual adap-
 tation to the EU's norms in domestic and foreign policy realms, as well as its
 secular modernization - in the course of the EU accession process. The
 debate revolves around the question of whether the Justice and Development
 party-led liberal-democratic reforms at home will result in Turkey's eventual
 membership in the EU - suggesting that Turkey's European identity would
 no longer be disputed at home or abroad - or whether Turkey will transform
 into a moderate Islamic country, where the increasing public salience of
 Islam will in the end erode the secular, unitary, and European character of the
 regime. This debate is currently unfolding at two levels, domestic and exter-
 nal. Domestically, the Justice and Development party (JDP) and its intellec-
 tual supporters have been confronting the traditional secular elites.1
 H. Tank Oguzlu is assistant professor at Bilkent University. Burak Bilgehan Ozpek is
 a PhD candidate at Bilkent University.
 1 These are the politicians in the Republican People's party, the main secular opposi-
 tion party in the parliament, and the members of the secular bureaucracy in state ad-
 ministration, mainly the military and the judiciary, as well as the politicians of
 traditional centre-right Motherland and True Path parties.
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 Externally, contending blocks of politicians and intellectuals in the European
 Union have been trying to assess the degree of Turkey's commitment to, as
 well as its readiness for, EU membership.
 Recently, this debate intensified when Turkey's constitutional court
 agreed to hear the case filed against the JDP by the chief state judge. The
 judge wanted to ban the party, as well as its influential political members, on
 the grounds that they represented increasing threats to Turkey's secular char-
 acter. High-level representatives of the European Union, including the head
 of the EU Commission and the commissioner in charge of enlargement
 process, have expressed their discomfort with this particular development
 and made it clear that European public opinion would find the idea of
 Turkey's governing party being closed down by the constitutional court odd
 (and indeed in the final verdict, the court argued it was the focal point of anti-
 secular activity, but did not ban it). On numerous occasions they have em-
 phasized that secularism in Turkey should never justify the banning of
 political parties or the suspension of the democratization process.2
 That said, this article argues that Turkey's decades-long Europeaniza-
 tion process might not be sustainable in the years to come, for two main
 reasons. First, the traditional supporters of this process in Turkey, mainly
 the secular elites, have recently adopted Euro-skeptic attitudes and become
 the champions of anti-EU sentiment. To the secular elites, JDP's support of
 Turkey's EU membership appears to be more tactical than strategic, in the
 sense that the continuation of the EU accession process has been considered
 by the JDP leadership to be vital for the party's ability to secure external and
 internal legitimacy in the eyes of its critics. This article underlines the point
 that absent the support of the secular elites for the Europeanization process,
 it is going to be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve Ataturk's goal to have
 Turkey become a part of contemporary civilization via inclusion in the EU.
 Second, the ongoing internal debate in Turkey seems to have weakened the
 hands of those in the EU who have thus far tried to justify Turkey's mem-
 bership on the basis of normative grounds. Turkey's internal debate has been
 mirrored inside the EU in that a group of normative supporters of Turkey's
 accession, the so-called liberal cosmopolitanists, applauds Turkey's liberal
 democratization under the leadership of the JDP government, whereas the
 other group of normative supporters, the so-called traditionalists, shares the
 2 The chair of the European Commission, Jose* Manuel Barroso, stated that the demo-
 cratic process should not be suspended for the sake of secularism, Radikal, 9 April 2008.
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 worries of Turkey's secular elites, yet at the same time fears the negative
 consequences of militarization in the name of protecting secularism.
 Against such a background, we first analyze the dynamics of the ongoing
 debate in Turkey by paying particular attention to the concerns of the tradi-
 tional secular elites about the intentions of the JDP, particularly with regard
 to Turkey's Islamization. Then an attempt will be made to highlight the
 growing schism between Turkey's normative supporters inside the EU. This
 article does not seek to examine the intentions and strategies of the JDP from
 its own perspective; such studies have been undertaken by others. Rather, the
 goal is to give a picture of the JDP-led developments in Turkey from the
 perspective of the traditional secular elites. The main conclusion is that the
 longer the ongoing debate inside Turkey remains unresolved - in other
 words, the longer contending blocks fail to reach a consensus on the need for
 Turkey to become both secular and liberal democratic - the more difficult it
 will be for the country's European supporters to justify their endorsement of
 Turkey's membership. Absent their support, European public opinion will
 likely remain Turkey-skeptic in future.
 DOMESTIC DEBATE
 The JDP-led government has accelerated the pace of Turkey's Europeaniza-
 tion reforms in recent years and the EU began accession talks with Turkey
 in late 2005. Institutionally, Turkey has come closer to the European Union
 than ever. Paradoxically, however, the degree of anti-EU feeling in Turkey has
 increased.* One of the most important factors fuelling Euro-skepticism has
 been that such EU-led reforms have been undertaken by the political
 successor of the traditionally anti-European, anti-western political Islamists.
 Against the legacy of the political Islamist tradition in Turkey, the JDP's re-
 cent efforts to meet EU accession criteria at home and abroad have created
 confusion. The traditionally pro-western circles in Turkey, namely the secu-
 lar elites, have been surprised to see the JDP turn into the greatest champion
 of liberal democracy in Turkey following its rise to power in November 2002.
 In the past, the leading figures of the party questioned Turkey's western
 connections - both the idea of liberal democracy and emerging strategic
 relations with Israel.
 3 The co-chair of the Turkey-EU parliament commission, Joost Lagendijk, evaluated the
 JDP government as embodying Turkey's "golden years" in terms of the EU membership
 process, 7 April 2008, www.euractiv.com.tr; "Support for EU membership decreases,"
 7 September 2005, www.bbc.co.uk.
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 It seems that once the constitutional court banned the Welfare party,
 the predecessor of the JDP, in 1998 on the pretext of its nonsecular prac-
 tices, and banned its leadership cadres from active politics, the word
 "democracy" gradually permeated the Islamists' political discourse. When
 the young generation of the Islamist Welfare party founded the JDP in 2001,
 they built their political campaign on ideas of freedom of speech, freedom
 of consciousness, and freedom of opinion.* Interestingly, while such fig-
 ures as Abdullah Gul argued in the early 1990s that Turkey's membership
 in the EU would amount to Turkey's suicide, they have transformed into
 ardent supporters of Turkey's accession to the EU in the 2000S.5
 Despite all the counter-arguments of the JDP leadership, suspicions
 about the degree of the party's commitment to secular democracy and liber-
 alism have not abated. If the secular elites believed that JDP support for the
 EU accession process stemmed from an ideational perspective - seeing
 membership as the most important guarantee of Turkey's secular western
 European identity - everything would have been fine. However, for many,
 this has not been the case.
 The main criticism levelled against the JDP in this regard has been
 that the party has supported the EU-led democratization process from a
 pragmatic point of view in order to curb the political influence of the Turk-
 ish bureaucracy, particularly the Turkish military, the self-appointed
 guardian of Kemalist ideology in Turkey.6 The JDP's critics assume that
 the EU-led democratization process would help create spaces for political
 Islamists to express their views more freely and to gain legitimacy in the
 4 Feroz Ahmad, Turkey: The Quest for Identity (Bir Kimlik Pe inde Turkiye) (istanbul:
 Bilgi Universitesi Yayinlari, 2006), 208-10.
 5 Abdullah Gul expressed his opinions about European Union when he was a deputy
 of political Islamist Refah (Welfare) party in 1995 as follows: "It is apparent that Turkey
 will not be able to join European Union. Most prominent politicians of Europe say that.
 European philosophers say that the EU is the Union of Christians. The head of the Eu-
 ropean Commission, Delors, the British prime minister and all others say this. When
 the EU's interests are concerned, Turkey is asked to give concessions, but when
 Turkey's interests are concerned, the EU does not give any concession," 19 December
 2005, www.milliyet.com.tr; Abdullah Gul, "Turkiye ni$in uye olmak istiyor?" (Why Turkey
 wants to be a member?), Le Monde, 26 September 2006.
 6 Gamze Cavdar, "Islamist new thinking in Turkey: A model for political learning?" Po-
 litical Science Quarterly\2*\, no. 3 (2006): 477-97.
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 eyes of the Turkish people. When the political Islamists had to leave the gov-
 ernment in June 1997, after the military-orchestrated coup - the so-called
 28th February process - they seem to have concluded that if they supported
 the EU-led liberal democratic reforms at home, they would not only have
 more maneuvering capability vis-a-vis other actors but would also be
 considered a legitimate player in Turkish politics. The JDP's critics have
 also wondered whether the ultimate goal of the party is to transform Turkey
 into an Islamic state via the EU accession process: after all, the public
 appearance of Islam would increase if conservative Islamists came to power
 through political elections. In this regard, the JDP's emphasis on the
 continuation of the accession process, rather than on membership itself,
 has helped perpetuate such fears.?
 The JDP's approach to foreign policy has also come under serious attack.
 The main criticism has been that the JDP sees foreign policy as an instrument
 to curtail the domestic influence of the Turkish military. Supporting member-
 ship in the EU, revising Turkey's decades-old Cyprus policy, and adopting a
 more liberal approach towards the Kurds of northern Iraq in the image of the
 EU's foreign policy norms appeared to be well-calculated attempts on the part
 of the JDP government at delegitimizing the influential role of the Turkish
 military in decision-making processes. The goal has been to make it dear that
 it is the JDP government (politicians, not other actors, such as appointed
 bureaucrats) that is entitled to define Turkey's national interests.8
 The secular elites, who have already had problems adapting to the chang-
 ing foreign and security conceptualizations of the European Union in the
 post-Cold War era, reacted cautiously to JDP-led democratization. After all,
 the more the EU insists on Turkey's liberal democratization as the most im-
 portant criterion for membership, the more the traditional primacy of mili-
 tary circles is contested. Increasing civilization would undoubtedly result in
 the demilitarization of policymaking processes. Furthermore, as the Euro-
 peanization process suggests the adoption of soft and civilian power instru-
 ments in the implementation of foreign and security policies, the military
 would no longer be able to build its undisputed legitimacy on hard power
 7 liter Turan, "Unstable stability: Turkish politics at the crossroads," International Af-
 fairs 83, no. 2 (2007): 319-38.
 8 Philip Robins, "Turkish foreign policy since 2002: Between a post-Islamist govern-
 ment and a Kemalist state," International Affairs 83, no. 2 (2007): 289-304.
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 instruments.9 Worse, the fear on the part of the secular elites has been that
 the JDP's instrumental adoption of EU-led liberal-democratic reforms would
 likely culminate in the erosion of Turkey's secular, homogenous, and uni-
 tary state identity, the sine qua non for the survival of the regime.10
 Historically speaking, the founders of the Turkish republic in the early
 1920s viewed the Europeanization process both as a path of internal mod-
 ernization and a foreign and security policy strategy. The assumption was
 that Turkey would rid itself of its image as a potential enemy of the west once
 it joined Europe as an equal member of the western international commu-
 nity and was recognized as European by Europeans themselves. The
 Ottoman empire, of course, had come to an end at the hands of the European
 powers in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. From this perspective, once
 Turkey became a truly European country, possibly following the confirma-
 tion of its EU membership, no one, at home or abroad, would dare challenge
 the indivisibility of Turkish borders and the homogenous/secular character
 of the Turkish state. Therefore, any suggestion that Turkey turn its face away
 from the west has long been regarded as threatening by the traditional sec-
 ular elites. The new Turkish republic aligned its foreign policy with those of
 the European great powers before World War II and with NATO during the
 Cold War era. Turkey's geostrategic and military contribution to European
 security earned it a legitimate place in the west and in Europe."
 The aspiration to become a member of the European family of nations
 also offers the main incentive for the secularization process to take root at
 home. The faster Turkey transforms into a European state in social and po-
 litical aspects, the sooner Islam ceases to be a danger to the secular founda-
 tion of the republic. The expectation was that alongside the Europeanization
 and modernization process, the individualization and privatization of Islam
 would gradually occur. This would suggest that religion would become an
 issue between God and the believer. Objective secularization, which can be
 defined as the separation of state and religion from each other, would grad-
 9 Fuat Keyman, "AKP ve di§ politika" (JDP and foreign policy), Radikal, 28 September
 2003.
 io Ole Waever, " The EU as a security actor: Reflections from a pessimistic constructivist
 on post-sovereign security order," in Charles A. Kupchan, ed., Atlantic Security: Con-
 tending Visions (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), 45-63.
 11 H. Tank Oguzlu, "Turkey and the European Union: The security dimension," Con-
 temporary Security Policy 23, no. 3 (2002): 61-82.
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 ually result in subjective secularization, which can be defined as the indi-
 vidualization of religion.12 The goal of the reforms that the founders of the re-
 public undertook with zeal was to usher such developments into existence as
 quickly as possible. The transformation of Turkey into a more conservative
 Islamic country alongside the Europeanization process would have been the
 last thing that the founders of the republic would have wanted.
 In contrast to the Cold War years, the 1990s increasingly led the EU to
 doubt Turkey's European and western identity. Diverging security concep-
 tualizations of the EU and Turkey have played significant roles in this re-
 gard. Not only has the absence of the Soviet threat helped dilute Turkey's
 security role in the context of continental Europe, but the increasing impor-
 tance of the Middle East in global power politics has resulted in a reluctant
 European attitude towards Turkey's possible EU membership. Turkey's prox-
 imity to the Hobbesian security environment in the Middle East has resulted
 in European public opinion's reluctance to see Turkey as part of the EU's
 Kantian security environment.
 Besides, as liberal pluralist democracy has gradually shaped the EU's in-
 ternal identity and enlargement policies, Turkey's growing democracy deficit
 in the 1990s helped to perpetuate its non-European identity. Furthermore,
 as the EU accession process eased the EU's involvement in Turkey's inter-
 nal affairs, the so-called Sevres syndrome has begun to haunt the traditional
 security elites in Ankara. The elites fear that just as European support to
 nationalist independence movements in the Balkans in the late 19th and
 early 20th centuries accelerated the dismemberment of the Ottoman
 empire, a similar process might repeat itself if the EU accession process
 results in Turkey's decentralization and federalization in the image of the
 EU's constitutive norms.1* Such concerns on the part of the traditional elites
 have become more acute during the reign of the JDP government since
 2002. This has happened for a number of reasons.
 First, the number of people who define their personal identity with ref-
 erence to Islam has increased. In response to a poll asking how they would
 define their identity, a substantial number of Turks responded that they were
 first Muslim, and then Turk. More dramatically, the number of women who
 12 Fuat Keyman, "Modernity, secularism and Islam: The case of Turkey," Theory, Cul-
 ture & Society 24, no. 2 (2007): 215-34.
 13 Ersel Aydmli, Nihat Ali Ozcan, and Dogan Akyaz, "Turkey's military march toward Eu-
 rope," Foreign Affairs 85, no. 1 (2005): 424-35.
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 wear the turban (as the modern headscarf is called) increased during the first
 JDP term in government between 2003 and 2007. While 56.3 percent of the
 women living in urban areas were wearing the turban in 2003, that number
 rose to 69.4 percent in 2007.^ This refers to not only the political but also
 the sociological Islamization of Turkey.
 Second, the majority of municipalities are under JDP rule following the
 local elections in 2003. Policies such as the creation of alcohol-free spaces
 within the boundaries of municipalities have raised suspicions as to the in-
 tentions of the JDP/5
 Third, the JDP's pro-Islamic foreign policy abroad has also been seen
 by secular elites as facilitating the process of Islamization at home. The JDP
 openly supported the Hamas-led government in the Palestinian territories
 and has tried to forge closer relations with the Sunni Arabic community in
 Iraq. Similarly, the government has increasingly emphasized Turkey's
 Ottoman past and Islamic identity with a view to attracting as much Arabic
 capital as possible.16
 Fourth, the JDP government's selective and discriminatory approach
 towards the issue of appointments within the state bureaucracy has also
 fuelled doubts. For example, men whose wives cover their heads have had
 more success in being appointed to influential positions within the state
 apparatus than those whose wives are uncovered. Similarly, the speaker of
 the previous Turkish parliament, Bulent Arinc, who is also a member of the
 Justice and Development party, stirred a political crisis when he argued that
 the next president of the republic, succeeding Ahmet Necdet Sezer, should
 be a religious person.1? This led the secular elites to conclude that the polit-
 ical Islamists have never given up their old strategy of transforming society
 in the image of Islam from above.
 14 Ali £arkoglu and Binnaz Toprak, Degi$en Turkiye'de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset (Religion,
 Society and Politics in a changing Turkey) (Istanbul: Tesev Yaymlari, 2006), 40; Tahran
 Erdem, "Turban, secularism, and religion in daily life," Milliyet, 12 March 2007.
 15 Michael Rubin, "Will Turkey have an Islamist president?" Middle Eastern Outlook,
 AEI online, 2 February 2002.
 16 Robins, "Turkish foreign policy."
 17 The "turban" refers to the modern style of headscarf. While the traditional headscarf
 is peculiar to the Anatolian village people, the turban is worn by young girls in towns.
 Many Turks believed that the main reason that Durmu§ Yilmaz was appointed president
 of the Turkish central bank was that his wife wears the turban. See also "We will elect
 a religious president," 16 April 2007, www.hurriyet.com.tr.
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 Fifth, Arinc and many others in the JDP suggested that secularism in
 Turkey should be redefined so as to make it more congruent with liberal
 democracy. The bone of contention here is that while the secular elites see
 secularism as the most important mechanism preventing religion from shap-
 ing politics and state administration, as well as keeping religion a personal
 affair, the JDP and its sympathizers tend to define secularism as freedom of
 conscience and religious practice, as well as the state's impartiality before
 different faiths. It also holds that all religious establishments should ad-
 minister their own affairs independently of state interference.18
 Sixth, Prime Minister Erdogan reopened the Kurdish question by an-
 nouncing in 2005 that Turkey had a specific Kurdish problem, in addition to
 PKK terrorism, and that the main reason for this was the way Turkish citizen-
 ship is defined in the constitution. To him, the word "Turk" appears to denote
 a specific ethnic group, as does the word "Kurd." He preferred the word
 "Tiirkiyeli" as an umbrella term under which different ethnic groups in Turkey
 would presumably feel comfortable.^ The JDP elites have also assigned Islam
 a cementing role that could unite Turks and Kurds better than a secular vision
 of citizenship.
 Secular elites objected to this understanding by arguing that Turkey does
 not have any Kurdish problem defined in ethnic terms, but only the problem
 of PKK-terrorism. They also argued that the world "Turk" is not an ethnic-ex-
 clusive term but includes all ethnic groups who happen to live in Turkey.
 Using the word Turk in an ethnic sense would bring nothing but further
 chaos and possible territorial dismemberment of the country in the future.
 The accusation levelled against the JDP has been that the latter seems to have
 adopted the EU's approach towards minorities, according to which they can
 be classified across ethnic, religious, and linguistic criteria, and all minori-
 ties should be given positive group rights rather than negative individual
 rights. That said, the secular elites have doggedly referred to the Lausanne
 treaty of 1924 to justify their claim that Turkey recognizes only non-Muslim
 groups as minorities.20
 18 "Secularism should be redefined," 26 April 2006, www.milliyet.com.tr.
 19 loannis N. Crigoriadis, "TurkorTurkiyeli?The reform ofTurkey's minority legislation
 and the rediscovery of Ottomanism," Middle Eastern Studies 43, no. 3 (2007): 423"38-
 20 Baskin Oran, Turkiye'de Azmhklar: Kavramlar, Lozan, Ig Mevzuat, Igtihat, Uygulama
 (Minorities in Turkey: Concepts, Loasanne, Internal Regulations, Interpretation, Im-
 plementation). (Istanbul: Tesev Yayinlari, 2004).
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 Finally, the JDP's approach to the Cyprus dispute has increased anxi-
 eties on the part of the secular elites. They find the JDP's Cyprus policy too
 reconciliatory towards the demands of the European Union. To them, Turkey
 should have clung to its decades-old Cyprus policy, according to which there
 exist two independent states on the island, namely the Turkish Republic of
 Northern Cyprus and the Greek Cypriot administration; the resolution of the
 Cyprus dispute within the EU accession process would be unfair because the
 EU is not a neutral actor in this process; the accession of the island to the EU
 prior to Turkey's membership would be illegal because according to the i960
 treaties, which founded Cyprus as an independent state, the island can never
 join an international organization in which Greece and Turkey are not equally
 represented; and, finally, it is the Greek Cypriots who have thus far prevented
 the unification of the island in a confederal or loose federal architecture.
 The JDP's Cyprus policy, meanwhile, appears to have envisaged the res-
 olution of the dispute within the framework of the EU-supported Annan
 plan. The JDP seems to accept that Turkey's membership in the EU and the
 resolution of the Cyprus dispute are closely interrelated. The assumption is
 that if Turkey contributes to the resolution of the dispute, the obstacles
 before Turkey's accession would evaporate. Given that the Greek Cypriots did
 not vote for the Annan plan but were admitted to the EU as a full member,
 that the EU has not thus far kept its promise of easing the trade sanctions
 and embargo on the Turkish Cypriots as part of its goal to reward the coop-
 erative stance of the Turkish Cypriots prior to the Annan plan, that the EU
 asked Turkey to recognize the Republic of Cyprus as the only sovereign power
 on the island, and that the EU partially froze the accession talks with Turkey
 in late 2006 due to Turkey's refusal to extend its customs union agreement
 with the EU to Cyprus, the secular-nationalist forces now vociferously argue
 that Turkey has gained nothing by revising its old Cyprus policy.21
 Apart from these developments, the concerns of the secular elites over
 Turkey's transformation into a more conservative Islamic country increased
 with the election of the new Turkish president in 2007. The people who
 argued vehemently against the election of Abdullah Gill, the JDP's nominee,
 had two main concerns in mind. The first pertained to how Turkey would be
 perceived abroad if Abdullah Gul became the Turkish president. With a first
 21 Ay§e Aslihan £elenk, "The restructuring of Turkey's policy towards Cyprus: The Jus-
 tice and Development party's struggle for power," Turkish Studies 8, no. 3 (2007): 349-
 63.
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 lady whose head is covered by a turban, Turkey's image as a Middle Eastern
 Arabic country might be strengthened at the expense of its western, Euro-
 pean image. This would certainly be counter to the foundational logic of a
 secular Turkish republic.
 The second concern was that the constitution endows the Turkish pres-
 ident with significant rights and privileges. Given that the presidential posi-
 tion is seen by many as the guarantor of Turkey's secular identity, as well as
 the harmonious relationship among different state institutions, the occupa-
 tion of this position by an ex-political Islamist might weaken the hands of the
 so-called secular circles in state administration. The 1982 constitution gives
 the president the right to appoint the members of the constitutional court,
 the higher education councils, the rectors of universities, the court of cassa-
 tion, and the state investigation council. If a member of the JDP occupied the
 presidency, the control of the governing party over academia and judiciary
 would certainly increase. With the presidency gone, who would be able to
 check the rising influence of the JDP-led government and parliament? The
 principle of separation of powers, a sine qua non for representative democ-
 racy and constitutional liberalism, might be in danger if the JDP took full
 control of the executive and legislative branches of government. This would
 likely catapult the judiciary to the position of the last bastion of Turkey's
 secular identity.
 The fact that the JDP's approach to democracy appears to have been
 proven to be more majoritarian than pluralist over the last five years has also
 sharpened the anxieties of the traditional secular elites. The JDP leadership
 has not always sought consensus or been restrained in its use of power dur-
 ing its first tenure in government, and it has seen the practice of building
 consensus as the subordination of the majority view to the minority's, which
 is not in accord with European norms.22
 Recent socioeconomic developments in the country have further led the
 secular elites to the view that Turkey is undergoing an Islamization process.
 In Turkey, the state has always been the main economic actor since the
 establishment of the republic, despite Prime Minister Turgut Ozal's liberal-
 ization measures in the 1980s. The JDP government has not been an
 exception: public expenditures have increased by approximately 70 percent
 during the party's time in power, boosted by its control of 54 municipalities
 outof8o.23
 22 Speeches of Erdogan, www.sondakika.com.
 23 Undersecretarlat of foreign trade, 30 January 2008, www.dtm.gov.tr; Mustafa Aysan,
 "Ekonomi'de son ceyrek" (The economy's last quarter), Radikal, 3 October 2007.
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 While increasing state expenditures and decreasing inflation have en-
 abled the party to gain the loyalty of the upper and middle classes, social poli-
 cies implemented by municipalities have earned the party the support of
 lower income groups. For example, the government has helped to subsidize
 lower income groups through its social aid programs while avoiding the rules
 of the free market economy. The practice of distributing food and coal to the
 poor people of Anatolia and metropolitan cities, who are conservative and
 value Islam in their daily life, contradicts the logic of the free market econ-
 omy. Seven and a half million Turks out of a population of 70 million were
 subsidized by the government between 2003 and 2007. The cost of govern-
 ment subsidies was 652 million Turkish lira in 2003 and had increased to
 1.413 billion Turkish lira by 2007.^
 Through the economic policies of the JDP, Anatolian-based business-
 men have prospered. This matters because while Turkey's traditional Istan-
 bul-based bourgeoisie wholeheartedly believes in the European ideal and
 supports Turkey's membership in the EU, the Anatolian-based new bour-
 geoisie does not have any particular interest in EU membership. Instead, it
 appears to value the positive impact that the continuation of the EU accession
 process might have on Turkey's political and economic stability, a precondi-
 tion for the success of its export-oriented businesses. Because this new bour-
 geoisie adheres to conservative values, its recent prosperity might suggest
 that Turkey has somehow transformed into a more socially conservative
 country.2* Islam has gained a more observable social status with its increased
 wealth.
 What is also noteworthy in this regard is that while the weight of Euro-
 pean capital in business interactions of the Istanbul-based Turkish Industri-
 alists' and Businessmen's Association - TUSIAD - has increased, the
 members of MUSI AD, the business association that many consider the tra-
 ditional supporters of the JDP, have begun to work with non-European,
 mainly Arabic, capital. In contrast to TUSIAD, the members of MUSIAD
 tend to believe in the principles of solidarity and Islamic brotherhood in eco-
 nomic life, and argue that Turkey's opening to the Middle Eastern and Arab
 24 Rifat Ba§aran, "Yardima muhta$ toplum"(The society that depends on help), Radikal,
 to May 2008.
 25 Ziya Oni§, "The political economy of Islam and democracy in Turkey: From the Wel-
 fare party to the AKP," in Dietrich Jung, ed., Democracy and Development: New Polit-
 ical Strategies for the Middle East (New York: Palgrave, 2006).
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 capitals would certainly serve Turkey's economy better than other options.26
 The latest statistics reveal that Turkey's trade with Middle Eastern countries,
 particularly the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, has increased
 tremendously, and the percentage of Islamic capital invested in Turkey now
 approaches European levels.2? The fact that the Turkish economy has begun
 to integrate with global Arab capital might lead observers to conclude that
 Turkey's non-European identity has been strengthened during the reign of
 the JDP.
 All these factors appear to suggest that one group of elites, raised in a
 western lifestyle and eager to become part of European civilization, is now
 being replaced by another group of elites accustomed to traditional Islamic
 norms. It is the manifestation of a transitional period that has led the tradi-
 tional secular elites to doubt the legitimacy as well as intentions of the JDP.
 THE VIEW FROM EUROPE: CONFUSING MINDS ABROAD
 Europeans appear to be at odds as to how to interpret the debate on secular-
 ism and democracy in Turkey. While some are optimistic about the extent of
 the reforms undertaken by the JDP and think that Turkey has recently come
 closer to the EU than ever in terms of democratization, others believe that the
 masses who took to the streets to protest the JDP's policies on secularism
 prior to the presidential elections in 2007 are the true believers of Euro-
 peanization in Turkey and are now in the minority. The odd thing here is
 that while the secular elites have increased their criticism of the JDP's poli-
 cies on the ground that they ran counter to the logic of Turkey's decades-old
 Europeanization process, an increasing number of Europeans have begun to
 view those same secular elites as the potential inhibitors of Turkey's EU ac-
 cession, for they appear to believe that the military's involvement in politics
 is legitimate insofar as Turkey's unitary and secular sate identity is at risk.28
 Excluding the particular EU circles that are traditionally against Turkey's
 accession to the EU on the ground of inherent religious, cultural, historical,
 and geographical differences between two sides (the categorical rejection-
 ists), Europeans who support Turkey's membership can be divided into two
 groups. While the materialist supporters tend to refer to the positive impacts
 26 Ay§e Bugra, "The claws of the 'tigers'," Privateview, autumn 1997.
 27 Foundation of Foreign Investment, July 2007, www.yased.org.tr.
 28 Walter Posch, "Crisis in Turkey: Just another bump on the road to Europe?" Euro-
 pean Union Institute for Security Studies, occasional paper 67, June 2007.
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 that Turkey's accession would have on the EU's economic and security in-
 terests, the normative supporters argue that Turkey should be let in if it meets
 the Copenhagen criteria and adopts the EU's secular and multicultural
 norms.
 The real argument is among the normative supporters, for both the cat-
 egorical rejectionists and the materialist supporters take comfort in arguing
 against or for Turkey's membership in the EU on the basis of observable ma-
 terial factors. While the categorical rejectionists are somehow fixated on the
 legitimacy of their arguments and appear not to be affected by internal de-
 velopments in Turkey, materialist supporters offer many factors in favour of
 Turkey's membership. They cite, for example, Turkey's geopolitical location,
 sophisticated military capabilities, growing domestic market, transit routes
 to the gas and oil resources of the Caspian and central Asian regions to Eu-
 ropean markets, and talented young population in their efforts to justify its
 accession to the EU. Materialist supporters take the EU's own interests as
 the starting point of their analysis and try to assess Turkey's contribution to
 the materialization of such interests on the basis of cost-benefit calculations.
 Recently, another argument that has become fashionable is that the mem-
 bership of a "moderate Islamic" country in the EU would not only facilitate
 the transformation of Muslims in Europe into European Muslims but would
 also help the EU reach out to the Islamic world in a cost-effective way.
 Turkey's membership would also suggest that the EU is not a solely Chris-
 tian entity and the idea of clash of civilizations as predicted by Huntington
 is not predestined.2^
 The normative supporters, on the other hand, pay close attention to the
 nature of Turkey's internal transformation. All normative supporters share
 the views that democracy and secularism are the EU's constitutive norms
 and that Turkey's Islamic character is not a priori an obstacle to its adoption
 of the EU's norms, for the EU is not a geographical or cultural project but a
 political one built on the universality of secular and multicultural norms.
 Turkey's membership is not a question of ifbut when*0 However, normative
 supporters are not a monolithic unit and can be divided into two groups.
 29 Helene Sjursen, "Why expand? The question of legitimacy and justification in the
 EU's enlargement policy," Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 9, no. 3 (2002):
 491-513.
 30 Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, "Negotiating Europe: The politics of religion and the
 prospects for Turkish accession," Review of International Studies 32, no. 3 (2006): 401-18.
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 The traditionalists have long believed that the path of modernization
 that Ataturk set into motion in the early 20th century would gradually help
 Turkey become a secular European country. In this view, the modernization
 of the Turkish society from above, despite its semi-democratic character,
 would not contradict the EU's secular norms, for this top-down moderniza-
 tion process would help create a large middle class in Turkey that would grad-
 ually adopt secularism in all aspects of life. If Turks succeeded in privatizing
 religion, Turkey would likely join the EU and the EU would not face the risk
 of being Islamized following Turkey's accession. Traditionalists do at least
 understand, if not tolerate, domestic efforts in the name of protecting
 Turkey's secular identity. As far as they are concerned, if secularism is not en-
 trenched, Turkey can never become a truly democratic country. They wel-
 comed, for example, the ruling of the European court of human rights that the
 decision of Turkey's constitutional court to ban the turban in public places in
 2005 - most notably in universities - did not breach European norms. In the
 same vein, European Commission member Louis Michel pointed to secular-
 ism as a common value held by Turkey and the EU, asking what kind of youth
 the EU wants to see in Turkey: modern or fundamentalist?*1
 These European circles have long cooperated with Turkey's traditional
 secular elites against common external enemies and have seen the elites as
 the bastion of European values in Turkey. For example, when Erbakan's Wel-
 fare party looked poised to win parliamentary elections in 1995, the tradi-
 tionalists hailed Tansu Ciller, leader of the True Path party, as Turkey's
 modern and European face and preferred that her party win, lest the Wel-
 fare party trigger Turkey's transformation into an Islamizing country. That
 is why the European parliament, however reluctantly, approved the customs
 union agreement with Turkey in December 1995. The goal was to increase
 the likelihood of Ciller's party winning the elections.32
 These circles seem also cognizant of the fact that European public opin-
 ion has recently become less tolerant towards Muslims. Given that Islam is
 now seen by many Europeans as the other against which the EU should de-
 fine its international identity, Turkey's appearance as an Islamizing country
 31 "Michel: Turkiye aB uyesi olmali" (Michel: Turkey should be an EU member), 31 May
 2007, www.abhaber.com.
 32 Cynthia Hanson, and Abraham T. McLaughlin, "The European parliament approved
 a customs union between Turkey and the EU," Christian Science Monitor 88, no. 14
 (1995): 2.
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 would certainly diminish its chances of memberships Such Europeans as
 Segolene Royal therefore see the people who participated in the street
 demonstrations in the spring of 2007 as the true representatives of the Eu-
 ropean way of life in Turkey. * They identified with urbanized middle-class
 women when the latter thought that another five-year rule of the JDP, to-
 gether with a JDP figure becoming the next president, would endanger their
 secular way of life. A similar reaction came from the Alliance of Liberals
 and Democrats for Europe, a European parliament group that underlines
 the indispensability of secularism for any modern state. Lale Akgun, a mem-
 ber of the Social Democrats in the federal German parliament, stated that
 Europeans are against Turkey's membership because they do not want a
 union with Turks who do not respect the rights of women, have sharpened
 religious attitudes, and wear turbans and takke.35
 What makes the picture seem more complicated for the traditionalists
 is that even though the Turks who joined the street protests are socially Eu-
 ropean in terms of lifestyle, they appear to be non-European in terms of
 political behaviour, for they are predisposed to see the military involvement
 in politics as legitimate whenever Turkey's Kemalist underpinnings are in
 jeopardy.
 Another group of normative supporters, the liberal-cosmopolitanists,
 does believe that the prospects of Turkey's accession to the EU have increased
 since the JDP came to government in 2002 and argue that liberal-democra-
 tic reforms undertaken during this era attest to this. These people assume
 that the JDP is not an obstacle in the way of Turkey's transformation into a
 secular state because the JDP knows that Turkey can never join the secular
 EU if it is Islamized. These circles tend to equate the JDP with Christian
 Democratic parties across Europe and see no clear evidence suggesting that
 the JDP has set into motion a radical Islamization project at home. Instead,
 the radical undertones of the so-called political Islamists have to a signifi-
 33 Lauren M. Mclaren, "Explaining opposition to Turkish membership in the EU," Eu-
 ropean Union Politics 8, no. 2 (2007): 251-78.
 34 French politician Segolene Royal has criticized Sarkozy's Turkey policy, and has ar-
 gued that we cannot close the doors on people who defend secularism by democratic
 ways, 4 May 2007, www.gazetevatan.com.
 35 "Adim adim avrupa: Almanya 1" (Step-by-step Europe: Germany I), 10 December
 2004, www.bbc.co.uk.
 I 1006 I Autumn 2008 | International Journal |
This content downloaded from 139.179.72.98 on Tue, 11 Dec 2018 15:32:58 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 I Turkey's Europeanization |
 cant degree softened over the last years. Olli Rehn, the commissar responsi-
 ble for EU enlargement, for example, has said that JDP is a post-Islamist
 party, very close to the Christian Democrats in Europe.*6
 These circles have grown optimistic about Turkey's secularization dur-
 ing the reign of the JDP rule, for Turks have moved to the sociological cen-
 tre and are well off economically. The argument is that the richer people
 become and the more they integrate with the world, the more privatized
 Islam in Turkey will be. Socioeconomic developments over the last years have
 strengthened the roots of a secular lifestyle. These circles also argue that
 Turkey's membership would prove that the EU is a multicultural area em-
 bodying the principle of unity in diversity, and beneficial to the EU in terms
 of its image in the Middle East.*?
 Even though liberal-cosmopolitanists support Turkey's membership on
 the basis of the Copenhagen criteria, they have recently grown suspicious of
 some JDP policies, such as defining adultery as a crime in Turkish penal
 code, banning the sale of alcohol within the borders of some JDP-led gov-
 erned municipalities, and insisting on women's right to wear the turban in
 public offices and universities.
 Normative supporters of both stripes have to wrestle with how to adopt
 a balanced view towards Turkey's secular character on the one hand and the
 liberal-democratization process on the other. There is no ambiguity in the
 minds of the normative supporters that the EU consists of member states
 that are both secular and democratic at the same time. However, when it
 comes to Turkey, it seems that traditionalists prioritize secularism over
 democracy whereas the liberal-cosmopolitanists prioritize democracy over
 secularism as the most important precondition for Turkey's EU accession.
 The traditionalists' dilemma arises from the possibility of Turkey's milita-
 rization in the name of protecting secularism, whereas the liberals' dilemma
 stems from the possibility of Turkey's Islamization in the name of democ-
 ratization. The risk here is that in the absence of the normative supporters
 soon reaching a consensus on the indispensability of Turkey's democratic
 and secular identity, and sending messages to Turkey accordingly, either mil-
 36 "Rehn: AKP korkusu abartihyor" (Rehn: Fear of JDP is exaggerated), Radikal, 31 May
 2007, www.radikal.com.tr.
 37 Hugh Pope, "Turkey and Europe: The way ahead," International Crisis Group report
 184, 2007.
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 itarization or Islamization would likely result in Turkey's perennial es-
 trangement from the EU.
 CONCLUSION
 In recent years, traditional secular elites and JDP circles in Turkey have
 united around the goal of membership in the EU. Secular elites have toler-
 ated the political influence of the JDP because of the beginning of accession
 talks with the EU. Otherwise, it is unimaginable that the Turkish army would
 have acquiesced in the weakening of its political and institutional preroga-
 tives. The continuation of the accession process has continued to encourage
 Turkey's political actors to avoid their differences and seek consensus.
 However, it seems that despite the formal start of accession talks in late
 2005, skepticism towards Turkey's accession to the union has increased.
 Both the German Merkel government and the French Sarkozy government
 are arguing for Turkey's attachment to the EU through a privileged partner-
 ship, rather then full membership. Sarkozy even maintains that Turkey
 should be included in the Mediterranean union rather then the EU.*8 Those
 who argue against Turkey's membership due to identity-related concerns,
 namely the categorical rejectionists, have been gradually gaining ground.
 Worse, materialist supporters have recently begun to view Turkey's trans-
 formation into a moderate Islamic country as being in the security interests
 of the European Union. However, this particular European perception of
 Turkey's emerging identity has proven enough for alarm bells to ring across
 the Turkish capital. The more the EU values Turkey's success in combining
 Islam and democracy in its fight against radical Islam, the more anxious the
 traditional secular elites have become. Furthermore, the ascendancy of the
 "political right" across European countries will likely make it more difficult,
 if not impossible, for normative supporters to press for Turkey's accession to
 the EU.
 Another discouraging development is that owing to the growing confu-
 sion about Turkey's identity at home and abroad, structural transformation
 in the country alongside the EU accession process has slowed recently. It is
 in this context that several human rights crises have transpired: in the last
 two years, some intellectuals, including Nobel prize winner Orhan Pamuk,
 38 Nikolas Sarkozy, "Liberty fraternity and modernite?" National Interest, July-August,
 2007,14-15.
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 have been sued on the grounds of "insulting Turkishness," as defined in the
 article 301 of the Turkish penal code.
 As for the future, this article holds that if the growing confusion in the
 EU culminates in the adoption of a reluctant attitude towards Turkey's pos-
 sible accession, the most likely scenario will be that the secular elites will
 consider the JDP-led liberaldemocratization process at home a threat to the
 Kemalist foundational logic of the country. After all, what is the point of un-
 dertaking all these reforms if the EU increasingly views Turkey unfit for the
 membership? The longer the confusion and ambiguity about Turkey con-
 tinues both at home and abroad, the likelier it is that consensus between the
 JDP and the traditional secular elites will collapse.
 I International journal | Autumn 2008 | 1009 |
This content downloaded from 139.179.72.98 on Tue, 11 Dec 2018 15:32:58 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
